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INTRODUCTION  
 
“If there is one amendment, that is literally first among equals, 
then it is truly the First Amendment.”1 The First Amendment prohibits 
prior restraints on speech, i.e., judicial suppression of material that 
would be published or broadcast, on the grounds that it is libelous, 
defamatory, or harmful.2 However, the imposition of subsequent 
liability for defamation does not abridge the freedom of speech 
protected by the First Amendment.3 It is this important distinction 
drawn by the United States Supreme Court—subsequent punishment 
vs. prior restraint—that denotes the permissible remedies and 
punishments in a court of law for defamation. One question remains 
unanswered by the Supreme Court: while the First Amendment allows 
for after-the-fact punishment for defamation in the form of money 
damages, or even imprisonment, does the First Amendment permit 
                                                 
∗ J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, May 2016.  
1 Cailah E. Garfinkel, The Importance of an Independent Judiciary and a Free 
Press, 22 SUM DEL. LAW. 28 (2004). 
2 There are a few exceptions to the prohibition on prior restraint discussed infra 
Part I.  
3 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301–02 (1964).  
1
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permanent injunctions against published or spoken speech that has 
been found to be defamatory by a judge or jury?  
Permanently enjoining defamatory speech is preventing speech 
before it happens. Traditionally, courts have consistently held that 
“equity will not enjoin a libel.”4 Put simply, money damages were the 
only remedy available in a defamation lawsuit. The prevalence of 
social media and Internet usage has changed the way our society 
voices opinions. Defamatory comments, opinions, and articles can be 
permanently placed in the virtual world with the click of a button. As a 
result of this instantaneous communication platform, the number of 
defamation lawsuits filed in the United States and around the world 
has significantly increased.5 In 2004, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Tory v. Cochran to decide whether a permanent injunction 
is a constitutionally permissible remedy in a defamation case, “at least 
                                                 
4 Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int'l 
Union, 239 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2001); Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 677 
(3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he maxim that equity will not enjoin a libel has enjoyed nearly 
two centuries of widespread acceptance at common law.”); Oakley, Inc. v. 
McWilliams, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that “never in the 
216 year history of the First Amendment has the Supreme Court found it necessary 
to uphold a prior restraint in a defamation case . . . .”). 
5 Ian Burrell, Libel Cases Prompted by Social Media Posts Rise 300% in a 
Year, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/libel-cases-prompted-by-social-media-posts-rise-300-in-a-year-9805004.html; 
Roy Greensdale, 23% Increase in Defamation Actions as Social Media Claims Rise, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2014, 7:06 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/oct/20/medialaw-social-media; 
Teresa Thompson, Internet Defamation Claims on the Rise as Online Reviews 
Impact the Bottom Line, NETWORKED (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://www.networkedlawyers.com/internet-defamation-claims-on-the-rise-as-
online-reviews-impact-the-bottom-line/. 
2
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when the plaintiff is a public figure.”6 Unfortunately, the Court never 
reached the merits, as the plaintiff died after oral arguments.7  
In the 2015 case McCarthy v. Fuller, the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals became the second circuit court8 to permit a lower court to 
issue a permanent injunction in a defamation case.9 In her concurring 
opinion, Judge Diane Sykes recognized “[a]n emerging modern trend” 
that acknowledges the general rule that equity does not enjoin libel, 
but allows for the possibility of narrowly tailored permanent injunctive 
relief as a remedy for defamation as long as the injunction prohibits 
only the repetition of the specific statements found at trial to be false 
and defamatory.10 Judge Sykes sharply questioned this modern trend 
because a defamatory statement in one circumstance, time, or place, 
                                                 
6 Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 736–38 (2005) (“ . . . Johnnie Cochran’s 
death makes it unnecessary, indeed unwarranted, for us to explore petitioners’ basic 
claims, namely, (1) that the First Amendment forbids the issuance of a permanent 
injunction in a defamation case . . . .“). The Supreme Court did, however, vacate the 
injunction as an overbroad, prior restraint on speech. Id. at 738. 
7 Id. at 734.  
8 In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit—with very terse reasoning—reversed a 
district court’s decision not to issue an injunction against defamation. Lothschuetz v. 
Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1208–09 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J. and Hull, J., 
dissenting).  
9 McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2015). Both the First and Second 
Circuits have declined to address the First Amendment arguments on the merits. 
Metropolitan Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l 
Union, 239 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2001) (striking down injunction as impermissibly 
vague, but declining to address First Amendment arguments); Auburn Police Union 
v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 904 (1st Cir. 1993) (leaving for another day the 
determination whether a specific injunction constitutes an unlawful prior restraint). 
The Fifth Circuit in Brown v. Petrolite Corp. allowed a lower district court to enjoin 
an oil service company from further disseminating information related to tests and 
samples that were the subject of a defamatory report about plaintiff’s products. 965 
F.2d 38, 51 (5th Cir. 1992). However, the Fifth Circuit held that the lower court 
could not enjoin “independent, reliable information that Petrolite may acquire in the 
future,” so it is unclear exactly how the Fifth Circuit views permanent injunctions 
against defamation. Id. The Fourth Circuit has held that injunctions on future speech 
are impermissible prior restraints. Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 
1967).  
10 McCarthy, 810 F.3d at 464 (Sykes, J., concurring). 
3
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might not be defamatory in another circumstance, time, or place.11 She 
reiterated that permanently enjoining defamation does not account for 
“constantly changing contextual facts that affect whether the speech is 
punishable or protected.”12 
Supreme Court precedent appears to support the conclusion 
that a permanent injunction against defamation violates the First 
Amendment. The Court in Alexander v. U.S. stated, “Permanent 
injunctions . . . that actually forbid speech activities[] are classic 
examples of prior restraints” because they impose a “true restraint on 
future speech.”13 The First Amendment right to free speech is not 
absolute; it “does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, 
without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted 
and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of 
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this 
freedom.”14 In any given case, "courts must balance free speech rights 
against other strong social interests, including society's interest in 
preventing and redressing attacks on reputation."15 This balance 
becomes particularly delicate in the context of defamation suits 
because, at its core, “the first amendment prohibits the state from 
interfering with the expression of unpopular, indeed offensive, 
views.”16 
The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak 
one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and 
thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common 
quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole. Under 
our Constitution, there is no such thing as a false idea. 
                                                 
11 Id. at 465.  
12 Id.  
13 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).  
14 Gitlow v. People of State of N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).  
15 ROGER LEROY MILLER & FRANK B. CROSS, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
TODAY: BUSINESS IN ITS ETHICAL, REGULATORY, E-COMMERCE, AND GLOBAL 
SETTING 119 (7th ed. 2013).  
16 Nat’l Socialist White People’s Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1016 (4th 
Cir. 1973).  
4
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However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on 
the competition of other ideas.17 
 
This Comment examines the modern trend allowing the 
issuance of permanent injunctions in defamation suits, despite the 
longstanding maxim prohibiting such. Parts I and II will discuss the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to 
impermissible prior restraints and injunctions. Part II will discuss 
Supreme Court decisions that struck down attempts by lower courts 
and States to restrain speech. Part III analyzes recent state and federal 
court decisions allowing narrow, permanent injunctions in defamation 
cases, and argues that these decisions are erroneous and cannot be 
reconciled with Supreme Court precedent. Next, parts IV and V 
critically examine the Seventh Circuit’s decision in McCarthy v. 
Fuller in which Judge Posner permitted an Indiana District Court to 
issue a narrow, permanent injunction as a remedy in a defamation 
lawsuit. Part V focuses on Judge Sykes’ concurring opinion, and 
contends that her understanding of First Amendment jurisprudence—
as opposed to the majority’s— is correct. Lastly, part VI discusses 
policy considerations that buttress the argument that injunctive relief 
should not be available in defamation cases—mainly, that money 
damages are an adequate remedy and permanent injunctions chill the 
exercise of free speech. 
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PRIOR 
RESTRAINTS ON SPEECH  
 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . .  
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”18 It is “no 
longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech[] is 
within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the 
                                                 
17 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984) 
(citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).  
18 U.S. CONST. art. I.  
5
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Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.”19 The Supreme 
Court has interpreted these guarantees to afford special protection 
against orders that prohibit the publication or broadcast of speech that 
impose a “previous” or “prior” restraint on speech.20 A prior restraint 
on speech is an administrative or judicial order forbidding certain 
communications, publications, or other speech issued in advance of 
the time that such communications, publications, or other speech are to 
occur.21 Prior restraints are “the most serious and the least tolerable 
infringement on the First Amendment rights.”22 When a court enters a 
permanent injunction in a defamation action, such a remedy is 
unquestionably a prior restraint on speech because it prevents speech 
before it occurs.23  
However, the First Amendment’s prohibition on prior restraints 
is not absolute. In 1931, the Supreme Court narrated three exceptions 
to the prohibition on prior restraint: (1) the primary requirements of 
decency may be enforced against obscene publications; (2) the 
security of the community life may be protected against incitements to 
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government; 
and (3) some overriding countervailing interest, such as when a nation 
is at war and such speech is hindering the peace effort.24 Prior 
restraints, even within a recognized exception, will be extremely 
difficult to justify, but “the purpose for which a prior restraint is 
sought to be imposed ‘must fit within one of the narrowly defined 
                                                 
19 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).  
20 Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976).  
21 George Blum et al., Freedom from Prior Restraints and Censorship, 16A 
AM. JUR. 2d CONST. L. § 472 (2015).  
22 Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int'l 
Union, 239 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2001). 
23 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (stating “permanent 
injunctions . . . that actually forbid speech activities are classic examples of prior 
restraints” because they impose a “true restraint in future speech.”); Procter & 
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
district court’s entering of three injunctive orders on planned publication was a 
“classic case of a prior restraint.”). 
24 Near, 283 U.S. at 716.  
6
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exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints.’”25 These 
exceptions are intended to be very narrow in light of the fact that “it 
has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief 
purpose of the First Amendment’s guaranty to prevent previous 
restraints upon publication.”26  
Thus, the First Amendment strongly disfavors injunctions that 
impose a prior restraint on speech.27 Any prior restraint on expression 
comes to a court with a heavy presumption against its constitutional 
validity, and advocates have a weighty burden of showing justification 
for the imposition of such a restraint.28 Against this backdrop, the 
Supreme Court has consistently refused to enjoin speech, finding that 
after-the-fact punishment in the form of criminal imprisonment, fines, 
or money damages is acceptable,29 while prior suppression of speech 
by injunction is not.30  
II. THE TRADITIONAL RULE: PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS IN 
DEFAMATION CASES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON 
SPEECH 
 
Starting in 1800’s and continuing through the 20th century, 
courts held firm in their conviction that injunctions in equity could 
never restrain the publishing of defamatory speech, “however great the 
                                                 
25 Stuart, 427 U.S. at 592. 
26 Id. at 588. 
27 Metro. Opera Ass’n, 239 F.3d at 178. 
28 Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).  
29 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376, 386 (1973) (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)) (“[T]his Court 
has held that the First Amendment does not shield a newspaper from punishment for 
libel when with actual malice it publishes a falsely defamatory advertisement.”).  
30 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) (“In the present 
case, we have no occasion to inquire as to the permissible scope of subsequent 
punishment . . . . As has been noted, the statute in question does not deal with 
punishments; it provides for no punishment, except in case of contempt for violation 
of the court’s order, but for suppression and injunction-that is, for restraint upon 
publication.”).  
7
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injury”31 and “even though such publications are calculated to injure 
the credit, business, or character of the person aggrieved . . . he will be 
left to pursue his remedy at law.”32 Injunctions against speech were 
not permitted in defamation cases under early English and American 
common law, and the Supreme Court has never departed from this 
precedent.33  
As early as 1839, the New York Court of Chancery (an equity 
court) refused to stop the publication of a pamphlet that would have 
defamed the plaintiff, holding that the publication of a libel could not 
be enjoined “without infringing upon the liberty of the press, and 
attempting to exercise a power of preventative justice which . . . 
cannot safely be entrusted to any tribunal consistently with the 
principles of a free government.”34 The Chancery court alluded to the 
ancient Court of Star Chamber in England35 that had a habit of 
restraining speech by injunction.36 Since the Star Chamber had been 
abolished, the Chancery court noted that only one court had issued an 
injunction in anticipation of libelous speech, and “no judge or 
chancellor . . . has attempted to follow that precedent.”37 The court 
reasoned that, if the defendants persisted in defaming the plaintiffs, the 
victims were required to seek their remedies by a civil suit.38  
                                                 
31 Am. Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 F. 351, 354 (2d Cir. 1913).  
32 Id.  
33 Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1089–90 (C.D. Cal. 
2012) (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 157 (2007)).  
34 Brandreth v. Lance, 1839 WL 3231 (N.Y. Ch. 1839).  
35 The Court of Star Chamber was an English court made up of judges and 
councilors that arose out of the medieval king’s council and supplemented the 
regular justice of the common law courts. It was used by Charles I to enforce 
unpopular political policies, and became a symbol of oppression to the parliamentary 
and Puritan opponents of Charles. It was abolished in 1641. Court of Star Chamber, 
BRITTANICA.COM, http://www.britannica.com/topic/Court-of-Star-Chamber (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2016).  
36 Brandreth, 1839 WL 3231, at *26.  
37 Id. at *27.  
38 Id. at *28-29.  
8
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The United States Supreme Court has time and time again 
struck down injunctions against defamation. The seminal case is Near 
v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, where a newspaper appealed a permanent 
injunction issued by the lower court after it determined that the 
newspaper was “chiefly devoted to malicious, scandalous, and 
defamatory articles” concerning certain individuals.39 Minnesota law 
deemed a “nuisance” any malicious, scandalous or defamatory speech 
published by newspapers and other periodicals, and the Attorney 
General could sue for suppression by way of an injunction any 
newspaper it believed violated the law.40 Because the suppression was 
accomplished by enjoining future publication, the Court reasoned that 
it “put the publisher under an effective censorship,” and was thus 
unconstitutional. 41  
This principle was echoed in Organization for a Better Austin 
v. Keefe, in which a group of pamphleteers was enjoined from 
protesting a real estate developer’s business practices.42 Pertinently, 
the Court held that, “the injunction, so far as it imposes prior restraint 
on speech and publication, constitutes an impermissible restraint on 
First Amendment rights.”43 Further, the Court noted, “No prior 
decisions support the claim that the interest of an individual in being 
free from public criticism of his business practices in pamphlets or 
leaflets warrants use of the injunctive power of a court.”44  
Similarly, in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., the Court 
invalidated a Texas nuisance statute that authorized courts, upon 
finding that the defendant had shown obscene films in the past, to 
issue an injunction of indefinite duration prohibiting the defendant 
from showing any films in the future, including motion pictures that 
had not been finally adjudicated to be obscene.45 Absent “any 
                                                 
39 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 706 (1931) 
40 Id. at 701–02.  
41 Id. at 712.  
42 Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 417 (1971). 
43 Id. at 418. 
44 Id. at 419. 
45 Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980).  
9
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safeguards governing the entry and review of orders restraining the 
exhibition of named or unnamed motion pictures, without regard to the 
context in which they are displayed,” such an injunction could not be 
upheld.46 
Many constitutional law scholars have gleaned from the 
aforementioned Supreme Court holdings that injunctions on future 
speech, even if preceded by the publication of defamatory material, are 
unconstitutional.47 Indeed, it would seem that this was the Court’s firm 
conclusion in Near: even though the newspaper’s speech was chiefly 
devoted to malicious, scandalous and defamatory material, 
permanently enjoining future speech—even under those 
circumstances—was unconstitutional.48 The Seventh Circuit adhered 
to this long-standing tradition as recently as 2007 in e360 Insight v. 
The Spamhaus Project.49 Concluding that the district court abused its 
discretion in entering a permanent injunction against defamation, the 
Seventh Circuit stated, “[W]e note that there are sensitive First 
Amendment issues presented in the context of permanent injunctions 
in defamation actions. ‘Permanent injunctions—i.e., court orders that 
actually forbid speech activities—are classic examples of prior 
restraints.’”50 Without reaching an opinion on the injunction’s 
constitutional validity, the e360 court firmly reiterated that the only 
remedy in defamation lawsuits is an action in damages.51 Yet, many 
trial courts are starting a new trend, issuing permanent injunctions 
against specific statements that have been found to be defamatory by a 
judge or jury.  
                                                 
46 Id. at 317.  
47 See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Erwin Chemerinsky et al. in Support of 
Defendants-Appellants and Reversal, McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 
2015) (Nos. 14-3308, 15-1839), 2015 WL 4264749 [hereinafter Chemerinsky & 
Lidsky Brief].  
48 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 712 (1931). 
49 e360 Insight v. The Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2007). 
50 Id. at 605–06 (quoting Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). 
The Court ultimately “expressed no opinion on the constitutional validity” of 
narrow, injunctive relief, but instead vacated the injunction as overbroad. Id. at 606.  
51 Id.  
10
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III. THE MODERN TREND AWAY FROM THE TRADITIONAL RULE: 
COURTS (ERRONEOUSLY) BEGIN TO ALLOW NARROW, PERMANENT 
INJUNCTIONS IN DEFAMATION CASES 
 
The traditional rule that equity will never enjoin a libel is quickly 
becoming a maxim of the past. Today, some state and federal courts 
are willing to enter narrow, permanent injunctions in defamation cases 
where there has been a jury determination of the libelous nature of 
certain statements.52  In 1991, the Third Circuit determined that a 
permanent injunction in a defamation case was impermissible under 
Pennsylvania law, and noted that Missouri was the only state to allow 
such a remedy for “the better part of this century.”53 However, since 
then, several state supreme courts and federal courts have followed 
Missouri’s lead.  
 In Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, a California trial 
court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from 
making defamatory statements about plaintiff’s business.54 The 
Supreme Court of California, on appeal, held that the injunction issued 
by the trial court was overly broad “but that defendant’s right to free 
speech would not be infringed by a properly limited injunction 
prohibiting defendant from repeating statements about plaintiff that 
were determined at trial to be defamatory.”55  
 In O’Brien v. University Community Tenants Union, a landlord 
secured a jury determination that certain statements made by a 
blacklisted tenants’ group were libelous, and then sought and obtained 
an injunction against further libel.56 The Supreme Court of Ohio 
                                                 
52 Wagner v. Equip. Co. v. Wood, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D.N.M. 2012); see 
Hill v. Petrotech Resources Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302 (Ky. 2010); Balboa Island 
Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339 (Cal. 2007), as modified (Apr. 26, 2007); 
Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., Inc., 352 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 
1984); O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 1975); 
Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765 (Ga. 1975);  
53 Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 678 (3d Cir. 1991).  
54 Lemen, 156 P.3d. at 341. 
55 Id.  
56 O’Brien, 327 N.E.2d at 753.  
11
Motto: "Equity Will Not Enjoin a Libel": Well, Actually, Yes, It Will
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2016
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 11, Issue 2                        Spring 2016 
 
282 
 
affirmed the injunction, categorically finding that “[o]nce speech has 
judicially been found libelous, if all the requirements for injunctive 
relief are met, an injunction for restraint of continued publication of 
that same speech may be proper.”57  
 In Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, the Georgia Supreme Court 
affirmed a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from 
republishing libelous statements.58 The court reasoned that the 
injunction was not a prior restraint because, before the lower court 
issued the injunction, it was adequately determined that the speech at 
issue was not protected by the First Amendment.59 
Lastly, in Wagner Equipment Co. v. Wood, the District of New 
Mexico upheld an injunction prohibiting Defendant buyers from 
further defaming the Plaintiff’s logging operations business.60 
Defendants “undertook an email campaign to slander Plaintiff’s name 
in the business community, making ‘several false and defamatory 
statements’” injuring Plaintiff’s business reputation.61 The district 
judge reasoned that because defamation is unprotected speech, the 
“’special vice’ of a prior restraint is non-existent where an injunction 
is granted only as to statements previously adjudicated to be false.”62 
The reasoning in all four of these cases is erroneous. The 
Balboa and O’Brien courts incorrectly relied on the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown63 as a basis for concluding 
that a permanent injunction in a defamation case does not violate the 
First Amendment. In Kingsley, pamphleteers challenged a New York 
criminal statute allowing the authorization of an injunction pendente 
                                                 
57 Id. at 755.  
58 Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765 (Ga. 1975). 
59 Id. at 778–79.   
60 Wagner v. Equip. Co. v. Wood, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1164 (D.N.M. 2012). 
61 Id. at 1159.  
62 Id. at 1161.  
63 Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 346 (Cal. 2007), as 
modified (Apr. 26, 2007); O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 
753, 755 (Ohio 1975). 
12
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lite while the matter at issue was being tried and adjudicated.64 The 
Supreme Court upheld the statute as constitutional.65 Pendente lite is 
Latin for “while the action is pending,” and such an injunction remains 
in force—to preserve the status quo—only until the associated case is 
decided.66 An injunction pendente lite is, by definition, extinguished 
when the associated case is decided,67 and functions similar to a 
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.68 
Additionally, Kingsley fits within one of the narrow exceptions to the 
First Amendment’s ban on prior restraints: “the primary requirements 
of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.”69 Thus, 
Kingsley’s reasoning is arguably inapplicable to cases involving 
permanent injunctions on future publication of defamatory (non-
pornographic) statements.  
The Wagner and Retail Credit decisions were also flawed. 
First, both courts justified entering a permanent injunction by, in part, 
concluding that defamation is “unprotected speech.”70 This is 
incorrect. True, the Supreme Court has held that certain categories of 
expression receive less protection under the First Amendment—
including obscenity,71 defamation,72 and fighting words.73 But the 
Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota noted that, 
“Our decisions since the 1960’s have narrowed the scope of the 
                                                 
64 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440 (1957).  
65 Id. at 443. 
66 Pendente lite, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/pendente%20lite (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).  
67 Kingsley, 354 U.S. at 439.  
68 The Court itself in Kingsley referred to the injunction as “temporary.” Id. at 
443 (“In the one case [the bookseller] may suffer fine and imprisonment for violation 
of the criminal statute, in the other, for disobedience of the temporary injunction.”). 
69 Id. at 440.  
70 Wagner v. Equip. Co. v. Wood, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1161–62 (D.N.M. 
2012); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 778 (Ga. 1975).  
71 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).  
72 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
73 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  
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traditional categorical exceptions for defamation . . . and for 
obscenity.”74 Significantly, the Court said, 
We have sometimes said that these categories of expression 
are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech, or 
that the protection of the First Amendment does not extend to 
them. Such statements must be taken in context, however, 
and are no more literally true than is the occasionally 
repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity ‘as not being 
speech at all.’ What they mean is that these areas of speech 
can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated 
because of their constitutionally proscribable content 
(obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of 
speech entirely invisible to the Constitution . . . .75  
 
Thus, the reasoning in Wagner and Retail Credit that defamation is 
entirely unprotected is wrong.76 Defamation is not entirely unprotected 
by the First Amendment. Defamation does not, by its definition, ipso 
facto allow courts to suppress future speech by way of injunction.  
The Wagner and Retail Credit courts also inaccurately relied 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Commission on Human Relations to conclude that injunctions against 
defamation are permissible.77 The ordinance at issue in Pittsburgh 
forbade newspapers from publishing help-wanted advertisements in 
sex-designated columns.78 The purpose of the ordinance was to 
                                                 
74 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992). 
75 Id. at 383–84 (1992) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  
76 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (extending 
constitutional protection to an entire class of defamatory falsehoods that are uttered 
without actual malice); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 
(1974) (“The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to 
protect speech that matters.”).  
77 Wagner v. Equip. Co. v. Wood, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160–61 (D.N.M. 
2012); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 778–79 (Ga. 1975). 
78 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376 (1973).  
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proscribe discrimination in employment on the basis of sex and other 
classes.79 The Pittsburgh Commission issued a decision and order 
finding that the Pittsburgh Press violated the ordinance, and required 
Pittsburgh Press to cease and desist such violations and to utilize a 
classification system with no reference to sex.80 The Court held that 
the Pittsburgh Commission’s order, narrowly drawn to prohibit 
placement in sex-designated columns of advertisements for nonexempt 
job opportunities, did not infringe the First Amendment.81  
First, it should be noted that Pittsburgh Press was not dealing 
with an injunction at all, suggesting, like Kingsley, that its facts are 
inapplicable in answering the question of whether permanently 
enjoining defamatory speech is permissible. Second, the Supreme 
Court upheld the Commission’s order entirely because the speech at 
issue was commercial in nature.82 It is well known that purely 
commercial speech receives less protection under the First 
Amendment than noncommercial speech, and regulations restricting 
advertising about illegal products or services, or that is deceptive, can 
be freely regulated.83  Third, the ordinance at issue in Pittsburgh Press 
can correctly be characterized as a “regulation” of harmful speech and, 
as discussed supra, the Supreme Court has held that regulating 
harmful speech is acceptable in many circumstances.84 The Pittsburgh 
Press court noted that discrimination in employment is illegal 
                                                 
79 Id. at 378. 
80 Id. at 379. 
81 Id. at 391. 
82 Id. at 382 (“Our inquiry must therefore be whether the challenged order falls 
within any of these exceptions.”).  
83 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 
U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980). 
84 Id; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992). 
As the press has evolved from an assortment of small printers into a diverse 
aggregation including large publishing empires as well, the parallel growth and 
complexity of the economy have led to extensive regulatory legislation from 
which the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity. Accordingly, this 
Court has upheld application to the press of the National Labor Relations Act . . 
. the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 382–83 (citations omitted).  
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commercial activity under the ordinance and stated, “We have no 
doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a 
want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.”85 The 
ordinance merely affected the “make up” of the help-wanted section.86 
In contrast, issuing a permanent injunction against defamatory speech 
is not a regulation; it is a blanket prohibition in perpetuity under all 
contexts. Lastly, the Court pointed out that no suggestion was made 
that “the Ordinance was passed with any purpose of muzzling or 
curbing” speech,87 and the Pittsburgh Press was still free to publish the 
advertisements in a non-discriminatory manner. Conversely, a 
permanent injunction is issued with the overt purpose of “muzzling or 
curbing” speech, and it prohibits publishing such speech under any 
circumstance.  
The pitfalls of these four decisions underscore that the modern 
trend to allow narrow, permanent injunctions in defamation cases 
cannot be based in Supreme Court precedent or accurate 
interpretations of such. Fortunately, most courts have resisted the 
trend, standing by the wisdom of precedent and by the age-old maxim 
that equity will not enjoin a libel.88 However, in December 2015, the 
Seventh Circuit became the second federal circuit to join the modern 
movement in allowing narrow, permanent injunctions in defamation 
cases.  
                                                 
85 Id. at 388. 
86 Id. at 383. 
87 Id.  
88 Lan Sang v. Ming Hai, 951 F. Supp. 2d 504, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“For 
almost a century the Second Circuit has subscribed to the majority view that, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, injunctions should not ordinarily issue in defamation 
cases . . . . Accordingly, while Plaintiff may continue to seek money damages, the 
Court will not entertain her request for a permanent injunction.”) (citations omitted); 
Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Kramer v. 
Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 679 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding that the “jury 
determination exception” in defamation cases was impermissible under Pennsylvania 
law); Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W. 3d 87,91–92, 94–99 (Tex. 2014) (holding that a 
permanent injunction as a remedy in a defamation case is an impermissible prior 
restraint on speech under the Texas constitution, which the court noted is governed 
by First Amendment standards).  
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IV. MCCARTHY V. FULLER: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT BECOMES THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT TO ALLOW NARROW, PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS IN 
DEFAMATION CASES 
 
In 1956, Catholic Sister Mary Ephrem launched a new program 
of devotions called Our Lady of America.89 Defendant Patricia Fuller 
(“Fuller”), formerly known as Sister Therese, joined Our Lady of 
America that same year.90 In 1993, Sister Ephrem founded Our Lady 
of America Center in Indianapolis, directing the Center until her death 
in 2000, whereupon she willed all of her property, and the Center, to 
Fuller.91 In 2005, plaintiff Kevin McCarthy (“McCarthy”), a lawyer 
and Catholic layman, and Albert Langsenkamp, another member of 
the Catholic Church, met Fuller and committed to help her promote 
the Center’s work.92 The three worked together agreeably for 
approximately two years, until 2007 when they had a falling out.93 
Langsenkamp and McCarthy established the Langsenkamp Family 
Apostolate, and both claimed to be the authentic promoters of 
devotions to Our Lady of America and to be the rightful owners of all 
the documents and artifacts accumulated by Fuller and Sister 
Ephrem.94 Shortly thereafter, a retired postal inspector, Paul Hartman, 
assisted Fuller in “launching a campaign to smear McCarthy’s and 
Langsenkamp’s reputations.”95 A bitter lawsuit ensued, and McCarthy 
and Langsenkamp sued Fuller and Hartman for defamation in the 
Southern District of Indiana.96  
                                                 
89 McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 457 (7th Cir. 2015). 
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
95 Id.   
96 Id. at 458. McCarthy also sued for conversion and fraud, and Fuller and 
Hartman counterclaimed for theft, and copyright and trademark infringement, but 
those issues are not relevant to this Comment.  
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 Jurors returned a verdict on March 11, 2014, finding both 
Fuller and Hartman liable for defamation per se, and awarded 
$100,000 in actual damages and $50,000 in punitive damages to 
McCarthy, and $50,000 in actual damages and $1 million in punitive 
damages for Langsenkamp.97 The following month, McCarthy and 
Langsenkamp filed a Motion for Injunction Against Further 
Defamation with the district court.  
A. District Court Holding   
 
The District Court granted McCarthy and Langsenkamp’s 
motion for permanent injunction against further defamation by the 
Defendants.98 In a mere footnote, District Judge Lawrence 
“recognize[d] that there are First Amendment implications in 
enjoining speech,”99 but nevertheless summarily granted Plaintiffs’ 
motion, and amended the judgment to include injunctive relief, 
because Defendants’ response was filed late and exceeded the page 
limit set forth in the Court’s Local Rules.100 The court did not conduct 
a First Amendment analysis, nor did Judge Lawrence analyze whether 
a permanent injunction was appropriate under the applicable four-
factor test that all Plaintiffs are required to satisfy in order to be 
granted a permanent injunction.101 
  
                                                 
97 McCarthy v. Fuller, 2014 WL 4248469 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 22, 2014) (verdict 
and settlement summary).  
98 McCarthy v. Fuller, No. 1:08-cv-994-WTL-DML, 2014 WL 4672394, at *7 
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 18, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 810 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2015). 
99 Id. at *7 n.7.  
100 Id.  
101 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (a 
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court 
may grant injunctive relief: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate 
for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would 
not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”).  
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The permanent injunction stated: 
It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
Defendants Fuller and Hartman . . . are hereby 
permanently enjoined from publishing the following 
statements, as well as any similar statements that 
contain the same sorts of allegations or inferences, in 
any manner of forum . . . .102   
The judgment further ordered that Defendant Hartman take down the 
website operated by him at ourladyofamerica.blogspot.com.103 
Defendants appealed, among other things, the entry of the permanent 
injunction.104 
                                                 
102 McCarthy, 810 F.3d at 460.  
103 Id. 
104 As discussed supra in Section II, the Supreme Court has passed down three 
narrow exceptions to the ban on prior restraints of speech. None of those exceptions 
apply to the statements at issue in McCarthy. The injunction banned Defendants’ 
statements that:  
McCarthy suggested that Jim Whitta's name be forged on a quit claim deed; 
Plaintiffs bribed various members of the Clergy (including Catholic Priests, 
Bishops, Archbishops, Cardinals and Popes); McCarthy physically threatened 
Fuller or otherwise committed any wrongful act against Fuller; Plaintiffs are 
con-men, crooks, forgers, thieves, racketeers, or otherwise stole or converted 
property from Fuller or engaged in any conspiracy against Fuller with any 
Catholic clergy, lawyer (canon or civil) or investigator, or any Catholic lay 
person promoting the devotion; Plaintiffs stole any statue (including the 
Latrobe statue), crucifix, plaque, medallions, pins, gold coinage, website 
(including the ourladyofamerica.com and ourladyofamerica.org web-sites) 
and/or proceeds from Fuller's Key Bank Stock; Langsenkamp was involved in 
a car chase in which he chased Fuller around Fostoria; Plaintiffs used the name 
“Ron Norton” in an inflammatory email exchange that was first published by 
Hartman at his website, ourladyofamerica.blogspot.com; and McCarthy, 
without the knowledge or consent of Fuller, caused a will to be drafted for 
Fuller in which she left the Devotion to McCarthy. 
Id. at 460. 
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B. The Appeal to the Seventh Circuit  
 
Focusing almost exclusively on the breadth of the injunction 
issued by the lower court, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction, 
leaving it to the district judge to decide whether to issue a new 
injunction consistent with Judge Posner’s criticisms.105 The Seventh 
Circuit had four main concerns with the injunction issued by the 
district judge: (1) the jury did not specifically find which statements, 
of the nine listed on the jury instruction, were defamatory;106 (2) the 
District Judge enjoined statements that the jury never even 
considered;107 (3) the indefiniteness of the preamble’s language did 
not provide guidance for the injunction’s boundaries;108 and (4) in 
summarily granting the Plaintiffs’ motion and failing to consider 
Defendants’—admittedly, waived and late—arguments, the lower 
court failed to consider the public interest in issuing a broad 
permanent injunction.109   
One jury instruction listed each of the nine statements that 
plaintiffs claimed were made by the defendants and were 
defamatory.110 Judge Posner found it fatal to the injunction that the 
jury was not asked which of these statements had been made by the 
defendants and, of those statements, which were defamatory.111 Since 
the jury did not indicate which statements in the jury instruction it 
found to be defamatory, the lower court had no basis for enjoining 
statements that tracked this jury instruction.112 The district judge also 
enjoined statements that the jury was never even asked to consider.113 
For example, the judge permanently enjoined Defendants from stating 
                                                 
105 Id. at 463.  
106 Id. at 460. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 461. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 459–60. 
111 Id. at 460. 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
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that Plaintiffs had “committed any wrongful act against Fuller,” and 
from calling the Plaintiffs “con-men, crooks, forgers, thieves, 
racketeers, or [saying that they] otherwise stole or converted property 
from Fuller or engaged in any conspiracy against Fuller with any 
Catholic clergy, lawyer (canon or civil) or investigator, or any 
Catholic law person promoting the devotion.”114 Perhaps most 
offensive to the First Amendment, the lower court also ordered 
Defendant Hartman to take down his website, without making a 
finding that everything published on the website defamed the 
Plaintiffs.115  
Not surprisingly, the Seventh Circuit’s greatest criticism was 
the language of the injunction’s preamble, enjoining “any similar 
statements that contain the same sorts of allegations or inferences, in 
any manner or forum.”116 Judge Posner concluded that the injunction’s 
preamble was a patent violation of the First Amendment.117 The court 
held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires injunctions to be 
specific about the acts that they prohibit.118 Vague language like 
“similar” and “same sorts” does not provide guidance to the scope of 
the injunction.119 The court further conceded that forbidding 
statements not yet determined to be defamatory, and the order 
requiring Hartman to take down his website—which would prevent 
him from posting any non-defamatory messages on his blog—would 
unconstitutionally enjoin lawful speech.120 The remainder of Judge 
Posner’s First Amendment analysis, however, was minimal. He 
quickly dismissed the argument that defamation can never be enjoined 
because doing so would constitute a prior restraint on speech121 by 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 461. 
116 Id. at 461, 463. 
117 Id. at 463. 
118 Id. at 461 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56).  
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 462. 
121 Id. 
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concluding that such a rule “would make an impecunious defamer 
undeterrable.”122  
Whether the permanent injunction issued by the district court 
was a violation of Fuller and Hartman’s First Amendment rights was 
fiercely debated on appeal. The Seventh Circuit implicitly adopted the 
rule that a narrow and limited injunction is allowed to prohibit a 
defendant from reiterating the same, specific libelous statements.123 
Constitutional law professors and scholars Erwin Chemerinsky124 and 
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky125 filed an Amicus Brief in support of the 
Defendants and in favor of reversal. Chemerinsky and Lidsky 
concluded without hesitation that the First Amendment does not 
permit permanent injunctions against defamatory speech.126 To no 
prevail, the Amici urged the Court to follow the “long-held rule” that 
equity will not enjoin libel, and maintained that “[i]njunctions against 
libelous speech, after a final judicial determination, are prior restraints 
and cannot withstand the rigorous scrutiny due such orders.”127  
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 Id. (noting that, “Most courts would agree . . . [with the Sixth Circuit] that 
defamatory statements can be enjoined . . . provided that the injunction is no 
‘broader than necessary to provide relief to plaintiff while minimizing the restriction 
of expression.’”) (citing Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 346 
(Cal. 2007), as modified (Apr. 26, 2007)). 
124 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky is the founding Dean and Distinguished 
Professor of Law, and Raymond Pryke of Professor of First Amendment Law, at the 
University of California, Irvine School of Law. He has frequently argued matters of 
constitutional law in front of the nation’s highest courts, including United States 
Supreme Court decisions involving injunctions in defamation cases. Chemerinsky & 
Lidsky Brief, supra note 47 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 
of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980)..  
125 Professor Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky is the Stephen O’Connor Professor of Law 
and Associate Dean for International Programs at the Levin College of Law at the 
University of Florida. Professor Lidsky is the author of a casebook entitled First 
Amendment Law. She has also written extensively on issues of Internet free speech 
and defamation. Id.  
126 Id. at 4.  
127 Id. 
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C.  Judge Sykes’ Concurring Opinion 
 
Judge Diane Sykes concurred in judgment insofar as the 
injunction was vacated for its indefinite and overbroad language.128  
She disagreed, however, with allowing the lower court to re-issue a 
narrower injunction.129 In this specific case, she thought the court was 
ill equipped to fashion a constitutionally acceptable injunction because 
the jury did not make a statement-specific finding on defamation.130 
The “equivalent of a general verdict that defendants are liable for 
defamation” does not contain the necessary findings to support the 
issuance of a permanent injunction.131 Additionally, outside the 
bounds of this specific case, Judge Sykes rejected the “emerging 
modern trend” that allows for the possibility of narrowly tailored 
permanent injunctive relief as a remedy for defamation as long as the 
injunction prohibits only the repetition of the specific statements found 
at trial to be false and defamatory.132  
V. CRITICISMS OF MCCARTHY’S REASONING: JUDGE SYKES GOT 
IT RIGHT 
 
 The reasoning in McCarthy shared many of the same flaws as 
the state and federal trial courts discussed supra in Section III. Like 
the Ohio Supreme Court in O’Brien and the California Supreme Court 
in Balboa, the McCarthy majority mistakenly relied on Kingsley 
Books, Inc. v. Brown to conclude that, while the “Supreme Court . . . 
has not yet addressed the issue, . . . it has permitted injunctions 
preventing other types of scurrilous speech.”133 As Judge Sykes 
correctly pointed out, temporarily enjoining dissemination of obscene 
                                                 
128 McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2015) (Sykes, J., 
concurring).  
129 Id.  
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 464–66.  
133 Id. at 462 (majority opinion).   
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material is different from permanently enjoining defamatory speech.134 
She stated, “Defamation is materially different from obscenity. 
There’s a meaningful distinction between [temporarily] enjoining the 
distribution of a particular pamphlet once it’s been found to be 
obscene and enjoining a person in perpetuity from uttering particular 
words and phrases.”135 Judge Sykes’ reasoning is directly on point 
with Supreme Court precedent. In Kingsley, Justice Frankfurter 
reconciled his holding with Near because the New York law in 
Kingsley was “concerned solely with obscenity,” whereas the 
Minnesota law in Near concerned matters “deemed to be 
derogatory.”136 It is evident that the Supreme Court has traditionally 
treated obscenity and defamation differently, as reflected by the fact 
that one of the three very narrow exceptions to the ban on prior 
restraints is focused solely on obscene material.137  
Judge Sykes also argued that defamation is inherently 
contextual in that a statement that is defamatory in one circumstance, 
time, or place, might not be defamatory in another circumstance, time, 
or place.138 Permanent injunctions do not take into account these 
contextual factors that change how speech is characterized.139 Even a 
permanent injunction limited to the exact words found to be 
defamatory in one context might prohibit speech that would not be 
actionable in another. A defamatory statement today, when spoken 
tomorrow in a different time and in a particular context, may not be 
defamatory for a number of reasons, and thus entitled to full 
constitutional protection.140 For example, the injunction in McCarthy 
permanently prevented Defendants from stating, “McCarthy 
physically threatened Fuller or otherwise committed any wrongful act 
                                                 
134 Id. at 465 (Sykes. J., concurring).   
135 Id.  
136 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957).  
137 Supra section I.  
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 356 (Cal. 2007), as 
modified (Apr. 26, 2007) (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).  
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against Fuller.”141 This statement is incredibly broad, and it does not 
take a vibrant imagination to think of a context where such statements, 
if uttered, would not be defamatory—say, if McCarthy showed up at 
Fuller’s home and physically threatened her with a baseball bat.142 
That is the problem with permanent injunctions: they permanently 
prevent reiterating defamatory statements, even when reiterating the 
statement would not constitute defamation.  
In their Amici Brief, Chemerinsky and Lidsky expanded on 
Judge Sykes’ point that defamation is inherently contextual. They 
stated, “The richness of the English language and the myriad ways of 
expressing any given thought make it impossible for a trial court to 
craft an injunction against future defamatory speech that is both 
effective and that does not also bar the publication of constitutionally 
protected speech.”143 In essence they argue that, for an injunction to be 
effective, it will be overly broad because its parameters will be 
impossible to determine, while a specific, narrowly tailored injunction 
will be ineffective because defendants can just use different words to 
get around it.144 What is stopping a defendant, permanently enjoined 
from uttering certain statements, from avoiding the injunction’s terms 
by making the same point using different words?145 This situation, 
Chemerinsky and Lidsky argue, results in what is called a “revolving-
door injunction.”146 The plaintiff will then return to court to get a new 
                                                 
141 McCarthy, 810 F.3d at 459. 
142 Chemerinsky and Lidsky illustrated a similar situation in their Amici Brief:  
[A] statement that was once false may become true later in time. Suppose a 
court, after finding that a defendant defamed a plaintiff by saying that the 
plaintiff blackmailed her, issues a permanent injunction against the defendant’s 
repeating any similar statements. If the plaintiff subsequently begins 
blackmailing the defendant, the defendant would remain enjoined from saying 
so, even though the statement would be true and hence constitutionally 
protected. 
Chemerinsky & Lidsky Brief, supra note 47, at *16 
143 Id. at *4–5.  
144 Id. at *12. 
145 Id. at *14. 
146 Id. at *14–15. 
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injunction prohibiting the more recent statements from being 
uttered.147 If the modern trend continues to expand, revolving-door 
injunctions will become particularly common since the Internet allows 
for the rapid publication of opinions, and courts will potentially be 
forced to modify injunctions over and over. Thus, permanent 
injunctions do not take into account changed circumstances or 
contextual factors, rendering both broad and narrow injunctions 
unconstitutional prior restraints, and ineffective remedies for a 
defamed plaintiff.  
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST ISSUING INJUNCTIONS 
 
A. Money Damages Are Adequate to Compensate Defamed 
Plaintiffs 
 
In McCarthy v. Fuller, the Seventh Circuit observed that 
permanently enjoining defamation might be required in some cases.148 
Surprisingly, Judge Posner defended this holding almost exclusively 
on the assumption that plaintiffs would (potentially) be left remediless 
against insolvent defendants.149 Disagreeing with the customary rule 
that equity will not enjoin a libel, Judge Posner stated, “The problem 
with such a rule is that it would make an impecunious defamer 
undeterrable.”150 “He would continue defaming the plaintiff, who after 
discovering that the defamer was judgment proof would cease suing, 
as he would have nothing to gain from the suit, even if he won a 
judgment.”151 As applied to the facts of McCarthy, Judge Posner held 
that it was “beyond unlikely” that Fuller and Hartman could pay the 
judgment against them.152 “They will be broke, and if defamation can 
                                                 
147 Id.  
148 McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2015). 
149 Id. 
150 Id.  
151 Id.  
152 Id. 
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never be enjoined, they will be free to repeat all their defamatory 
statements with impunity.”153  
Apparently, the McCarthy majority was concerned that 
McCarthy and Langsenkamp (and other plaintiffs in the future) would 
have no remedy because all they would obtain is an uncollectible 
money judgment.154 This reasoning is curious, however, because many 
defendants—in tort and contract lawsuits, for example—are, or 
become, judgment proof, 155 and the usual remedy for defamation has 
always been damages.156 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
compensated plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have been violated 
with monetary damages.157 Moreover, in lawsuits outside the realm of 
defamation where plaintiffs often request injunctive relief (e.g., 
copyright infringement cases), few courts are willing to consider 
insolvency as a factor in determining whether an injunction should be 
issued.158  
                                                 
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 
603, 606 (2006) (Noting that when tort claims are large enough to litigate, many 
Americans are judgment proof, lacking sufficient assets to pay the judgment in full). 
156 See Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 1967) (“There is usually 
an adequate remedy at law which may be pursued in seeking redress from 
harassment and defamation.”); Karhani v. Meijer, 270 F.Supp.2d 926, 930 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003); Kessler v. General Servs. Admin., 236 F.Supp. 693, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964), aff’d per curiam, 341 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1964) (refusing to enter an injunction 
against libel because, “As a general rule, a court will not issue an injunction to 
restrain torts against the person, since the remedy at law is adequate.”).  
157 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (damages resulting from § 1983 
violations against individuals); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (damages 
awards under Civil Rights Act of 1871 governed by principle of compensation); 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agent, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (action for 
damages directly under Fourth Amendment).  
158 See Weinstein v. Aisenberg, 758 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) 
dismissed, 767 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 2000) (“Even where the party seeking injunctive 
relief alleges that the opposing party may dissipate bank assets, a judgment for 
money damages is adequate and injunctive relief is improper, notwithstanding the 
possibility that a money judgment will be uncollectible.”). 
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This is not to say that a reputation has a price tag; to the 
contrary, sometimes money damages, no matter how high, can never 
make a plaintiff whole again. But “the law often relies on monetary 
damages to partially recompense a loss even when those damages 
cannot perfectly repair the damage done.”159 Fox Sports Broadcaster 
Erin Andrews was recently awarded $55 million in damages—an 
award she likely will never receive in full.160 Andrews’ stalker, 
defendant Michael David Barrett, surreptitiously videotaped her 
through a peephole in the privacy of Andrews’ own hotel room and 
posted nude videos of her on the Internet for millions of viewers to 
see.161 $28 of the $55 million judgment was assigned to Barrett 
individually (the rest was assigned to the hotels that were negligent in 
protecting Andrews’ privacy).162 Many journalists have surmised that 
if Andrews receives any money from Barrett, it will likely be a very 
small amount.163 Similarly, in wrongful death cases, courts frequently 
place a “price tag” on the plaintiff’s harm, when in reality no amount 
of money can remedy the wrongful loss of life.164 Andrews was 
demeaned, embarrassed, and violated when nude photographs were 
posted, without her consent, on the Internet. The loved ones of a 
wrongfully killed individual are undoubtedly permanently wounded. 
And defamed plaintiffs, like McCarthy and Langsenkamp, may never 
get their good reputation back. Nevertheless, money damages have 
                                                 
159 Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Interlace Medical, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 (D. 
Mass. 2013).  
160 Stacey Barchenger, Erin Andrews Lawsuit: How Much of $55M Judgment 
Will She Get?, TENNESSEAN (Mar. 9, 2016), 
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2016/03/09/how-much-55m-judgment-erin-
andrews-get/81500906/ (“Barrett is what is known in the legal realm as ‘judgment 
proof;’ meaning he has no assets from which Andrews can collect money.”); 
Michael McCann, Will Erin Andrews be Paid the $55M She Was Awarded in 
Lawsuit?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.si.com/more-
sports/2016/03/07/erin-andrews-wins-55-million-hotel-lawsuit. 
161 Id.  
162 Id.  
163 Id.  
164 Id. (noting that the average award for the wrongful death of an adult female 
is $3 million).  
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always compensated in-compensable harms, and the First 
Amendment’s protection should not turn on whether a defendant is 
judgment proof. The McCarthy reasoning wrongly implies that the 
right to be free from prior restraints on speech stops at cases with 
insolvent defendants.165 In light of the dangers of infringing First 
Amendment rights, the scale should tilt in favor of money damages 
over an injunction.  
B. The Public Interest is Disserved When Courts Issue a 
Permanent Injunction in Defamation Cases: The Potential 
Chilling of Free Speech 
 
Perhaps the most obvious consequence of this modern trend is 
the potential chilling of free and legitimate speech. Unlike subsequent 
punishment for defamation or harmful speech activity, the prior 
restraint of speech before it occurs deprives the public of information 
that should otherwise be disseminated. Each time a court enters a 
permanent injunction in a defamation case in favor of one plaintiff, 
everyone’s constitutional right to free speech is eroded. The Seventh 
Circuit permitted the district court to issue a narrow, permanent 
injunction against only the specific statements that have been found to 
be defamatory.166 Whether an injunction could permissibly be issued, 
according to the McCarthy majority, turned on the breadth of the 
injunction and what exactly it enjoined.167 However, a permanent 
injunction, no matter how specific, sweeps free speech within its 
confines making the breadth of the injunction immaterial under a First 
Amendment analysis. 
In refusing to issue a temporary restraining order against 
defendant’s distributing offensive pamphlets, the Eastern District of 
Michigan in its 2003 decision Karhani v. Meijer recognized that the 
breadth of the injunction played no role in the Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
165 McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2015) (Sykes, J., 
concurring).  
166 Id. at 463 (majority opinion).  
167 Id.  
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decision in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe.168 The plaintiff 
in Karhani attempted to persuade the court that the temporary 
restraining order was permissible because it was extremely limited in 
its scope.169 The district court was unconvinced, observing that the 
Supreme Court in Keefe “was simply concerned with the 
impermissible restraint on First Amendment speech caused by the 
prior restraint imposed by the state courts.”170 Indeed, like the 
preamble of the injunction at issue in McCarthy, the broad language of 
the injunction issued in Keefe proved fatal. In Keefe, the Illinois trial 
court entered an injunction enjoining petitioners from passing out 
pamphlets, leaflets or literature “of any kind”.171 Unlike the Seventh 
Circuit in McCarthy, though, the Keefe and Karhani courts did not 
remand to the district court with the possibility to fabricate a narrower 
injunction.172 Instead, the Supreme Court firmly concluded that “[n]o 
prior decisions support the claim that the interest of an individual in 
being free from public criticism of his business practices in pamphlets 
or leaflets warrants use of the injunctive power of a court,”173 and 
vacated the injunction.  
 Similarly, in Kinney v. Barnes, the Texas Supreme Court held 
that requesting an injunction on future speech was “the essence of 
prior restraint[.]”174 The plaintiff in Kinney filed a defamation lawsuit 
regarding defamatory online posts and requested a permanent 
injunction on any similar future statements.175 The Texas Supreme 
Court refused to prohibit future speech based on adjudication that 
                                                 
168 Karhani v. Meijer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 926, 933 (E.D. Mich. 2003).  
169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 417 (1971) (emphasis 
added).  
172 Id. at 420; Karhani, 270 F.Supp.2d at 930. 
173 Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added).  
174 Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 93 (Tex. 2014). 
175 Id. at 89.  
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certain statements were defamatory because doing so would 
impermissibly threaten to chill protected speech.176 
Injunctions are an incredibly powerful tool. Injunctions 
frequently have consequences so sweeping that they shut down 
operating businesses or otherwise dramatically affect the rights of the 
parties involved in an irreversible manner. “Put simply, injunction 
proceedings are high stakes poker.”177 The Supreme Court has 
reiterated that courts must “pay particular regard for the public 
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of 
injunction.”178 The public consequences are most severe in the First 
Amendment context, as this modern trend has the effect of potentially 
chilling lawful and legitimate speech. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 On March 29, 2016, Fuller filed a petition for certiorari with 
the United States Supreme Court.179 Her petition was denied on April 
25.180 Our society relies on the Internet as its main platform for 
communication. The intense debates surrounding net neutrality in the 
upcoming presidential elections show how important many people 
believe it is to preserve every citizen’s right to communicate freely 
online. But more Internet communication likely means more 
defamation lawsuits.181 Thus, it is imperative that the Supreme Court 
                                                 
176 Id. at 101. 
177 Mark D. Bradshaw, White Paper, Injunctions—A Practical Guide to One of 
the Law’s Most Powerful Tools, STEVENS & LEE (Jan. 1, 2002), 
http://www.stevenslee.com/injunctions-a-practical-guide-to-one-of-the-laws-most-
powerful-tools/.  
178 Winter v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 
179 McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 
(U.S. Mar. 29, 2016) (No. 15-212). 
180 Fuller v. Langsenkamp, 136 S.Ct. 1726 (2016).  
181 See, e.g., Laura Parker, Jury Awards $11.3M over Defamatory Internet 
Posts, USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2006, 10:53 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-10-10-internet-defamation-
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determine whether injunctions against defamation violate the First 
Amendment’s prohibition on prior restraints.  
As this Comment highlights, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
struck down injunctions against harmful speech.182 Prior restraints are 
the least tolerable infringements on First Amendment rights. Thus, this 
modern trend does not appear to comport with precedent. Moreover, as 
Chemerinsky and Lidsky make clear from a practical point of view, 
injunctions against defamation—no matter how narrow or broad—just 
do not work. The context-dependence of defamation renders injunctive 
relief against it both ineffective and blatantly unconstitutional. Lastly, 
public policy (and tradition) dictates that money damages are adequate 
to remedy a defamed plaintiff. Judge Posner’s concern about the 
infamous undeterrable, insolvent defendant cannot justify the entrance 
of a remedy that infringes First Amendment rights. The American 
judicial system has long used money damages to compensate in-
compensable harms including wrongful death and violations of 
citizens’ constitutional rights. And, most importantly, injunctions 
against defamation have the effect of chilling free speech. There is a 
profound national interest in the uninhibited debate of issues. The 
imperfection of our legal system requires us to protect defamation, not 
because it is inherently worth protecting, but so we can ensure that 
legitimate and lawful speech is not mistakenly penalized.183 Thus, the 
modern trend to issue permanent injunctions against defamation must 
be stopped.  
 
                                                                                                                   
case_x.htm (positing that this case could represent a coming trend in court fights 
over online messages).  
182 See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980); Org. for a 
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 
283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931). 
183 Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the 
Chilling Effect, COLL. OF WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCH., SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 
707 (1978). 
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